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STATEMENT Of JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the 
Plaintiff/Appellant's First Amended Complaint in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis. 
This Court has jurisdiction of Plaintiff/Appellant's appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF HPVIEW 
1. Is an employee prevented from bringing an action 
against the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier 
for lack of good faith and fair dealing? 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. State Tax 
Comm. v. Industrial Comm., 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984). 
2. May the District Court, in granting a motion to 
dismiss, state that all of the material allegations of the 
Complaint were considered true, rather than recite each 
allegation of the complaint in the court's order of dismissal. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 
1984) . 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and administrative rules are referred 
to herein and are set out verbatim in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Admin. § 31A-22-1003 
Utah Code Admin. § 31A-22-1004 
Utah Code Admin. § 31A 22-1008 
Utah Code Admin. §§ 41-12a-301 to 303 
Utah Code Admin. § 41-12a-102(9) 
Utah Code Admin. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
Utah Admin. R. R 568-1-3E 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Christine Savage ("Ms. Savage") filed a 
complaint against Defendant/Appellee Educators Insurance Company 
("Educators") alleging, inter alia, bad faith adjusting of Ms. 
Savage's worker's compensation claim. (R. 2-11). Upon 
Educators' Motion to Dismiss, (R. 16-30), Ms. Savage filed her 
First Amended Complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction 
of severe emotional distress, tortious or bad faith conduct, 
breach of fiduciary relationship, and interference with a 
protected property interest. (R. 54-65). 
Educators renewed its Motion to Dismiss as to the First 
Amended Complaint. (R. 77-86). The District Court granted 
Educators' motion (R. 120-123) and issued a final order 
dismissing the First Amended Complaint in its entirety, with 
prejudice. (R. 131-143). Ms. Savage appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which assigned the case to this Court. 
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STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Educators provides Jordan School Districts workerfs 
compensation insurance,1 (R.55). Ms. Savage was an employee of 
Jordan School District on January 5, 1987, when she was injured 
in an accident arising out of and in the course of her 
employment. (R.55). 
Three physicians recommended that Ms. Savage undergo dorsal 
column stimulator treatment. (R.55). Educators referred Ms. 
Savage to Dr. Gerald Moress for an independent medical 
examination (hereinafter "IME"). (R.55). Dr. Moress indicated 
in his IME report that he knew of no further treatment for Ms. 
Savage and that it was not likely that a dorsal column stimulator 
treatment would relieve Ms. Savage's pain. (R.55-56). 
Based on the recommendation of Dr. Moress, Educators 
informed Ms. Savage that further medical treatment would not be 
covered by worker's compensation insurance, with the exception of 
continued coverage for psychiatric treatment. (R.56). 
Because this appeal arises from a motion to dismiss, the 
allegation in Ms. Savage's Amended Complaint that Educators 
provides worker's compensation insurance for Jordan School 
District is accepted as true. However, in reality Jordan School 
District is self-insured and has contracted with Educators to 
administer and adjust the District's worker's compensation 
claims. 
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Later, in settlement of Ms, Savage's worker's compensation 
claim, Educators, Ms. Savage, and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
entered a Stipulated Findings and Order. As part of that 
settlement, Educators agreed to pay for Ms. Savage's disputed 
medical expenses. (R.56). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Savage raises several issues in her brief, but discusseis 
only two. Those are (1) whether an employee may bring a cause df 
action for bad faith against the employer's worker's compensation 
insurance carrier, and (2) whether the District Court must recite 
all allegations of the complaint in granting a motion to dismiss. 
No other issue is supported in her argument, and therefore the 
additional issues should not be considered on appeal. 
Ms. Savage may not bring an action for bad faith against 
Educators because she is not a party to the worker's compensation 
insurance contract. That contract is between Educators and the 
employer, Jordan School District. This court has already 
determined that a third party claimant may not bring a bad faith 
action against an insurer. Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). The Pixton holding was based 
on the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Beck v. Farmer's Ins. 
Exch.. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). The Beck court held that an 
action for bad faith against an insurer is based in contract, mot 
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in tort. Pixton held that because a third party claimant is not 
a party to the insurance contract, no bad faith action is 
possible. Ms. Savage is a third party claimant, and therefore 
may not bring a bad faith action against Educators. 
Ms. Savage claims that workers compensation insurance is 
unique because it is required by statute, However, other 
insurance, such as automobile liability insurance, is also 
required by statute. This fact did not alter the Pixton court's 
decision to deny a cause of action for bad faith, where the 
plaintiff had named as a defendant the liability insurer of the 
driver who caused the plaintiff's injuries. 
Ms. Savage asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1004 
provides a statutory right for employees to bring a bad faith 
action against worker's compensation insurers. To the contrary, 
that section does not create any new cause of action. It merely 
provides that worker's compensation insurance contracts shall 
allow an employee to seek worker's compensation benefits directly 
from the insurer. The statute does not create or consider any 
other causes of action. 
Ms. Savage claims that the District Court failed to consider 
all material allegations of her Amended Complaint in granting 
Educator's motion to dismiss. In reality, the District Court 
specifically stated that all material allegations of a complaint 
are considered. These specific allegations of the Amended 
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Complaint which Ms. Savage claims were not considered were in 
fact referred to individually by the District Court in its 
written decision. Moreover, the District Court carefully 
reviewed each cause of action raised in the Amended Complaint in 
its Conclusions of Law. There is no doubt that the District 
Court considered all of the material allegations of the Amended 
Complaint as true. Accordingly, the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
Ms. Savage's brief identifies several issues presented, but 
discusses only two of them. First, she asserts that an injured 
employee who receives worker's compensation benefits should be 
entitled to bring an action for bad faith against the employer's 
worker's compensation insurer. Second, Ms. Savage claims that 
the District Court did not consider all of the allegations raised 
in her First Amended Complaint when the court granted Educators' 
Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons stated below, Ms. Savage's 
arguments are without merit, and the District Court's Order of 
Dismissal should be affirmed. 
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POINT I: MS. SAVAGE MAY NOT RELY ON ISSUES NOT 
SUPPORTED IN HER BRIEF 
In her brief Ms. Savage has augmented the issues which she 
claims must be determined to resolve this matter. In her 
Docketing Statement, dated September 30, 1992, Ms. Savage stated 
at page 5 that the issues presented in her appeal were (1) 
whether an injured worker receiving worker's compensation 
benefits could bring "a bad faith claim against the employer's 
worker's compensation insurance carrier," and (2) whether the 
District Court erred in not repeating each allegation of the 
Complaint in granting the Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Savage did not 
identify any other issues in her docketing statement or notice of 
appeal. However, in her brief, Ms. Savage claims three 
additional issues which she did not raise before. Briefly, these 
issues involve whether an employee can bring an action against 
the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier for 
(1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (2) punitive 
damages, and (3) breach of a fiduciary relationship between the 
employee and the insurer. Because these issues were not 
identified in the docketing statement, they may not be raised in 
the brief. Moreover, while Ms. Savage raises these additional 
issues, she fails to support them in the body of her brief. 
Therefore, this Court should not consider them. State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989); State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d 
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1300 (Utah App. 1990); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 869 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
POINT II: AN EMPLOYEE MAY NOT BRING AN ACTION FOR BAD 
FAITH AGAINST THE EMPLOYER'S WORKERfS 
COMPENSATION INSURER 
Ms. Savage may not bring an action for bad faith against 
Educators. She is a third party whose injury entitled her to 
make a claim on Jordan School District's worker's compensation 
insurance with Educators. The contract of insurance is between 
Jordan School District (the "District") and Educators. According 
to the allegations of the First Amended Complaint, the District 
is the insured and Educators is the insurer. Ms. Savage is not a 
party to the insurance contract. In other words, Ms. Savage is a 
third party making a claim against an insured, the District. 
That an employer is the insured under a worker's compensation 
policy is made clear by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1008, which 
refers twice to the employer as "the insured employer." See full 
text of statute at Addendum, p. A15. Ms. Savage now alleges that 
she has an action for bad faith against the insurer, Educators. 
This issue has already been addressed by the Court of Appeals in 
Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App* 
1991), where this Courtfs ruling was based on the Utah Supreme 
Court's prior holdings in bad faith insurance claims. This Court 
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made it clear that a third party may not bring an action for bad 
faith against the insurer. 
In Pixton, this Court addressed the specific issue of 
whether a third party recipient of benefits from an insurance 
policy may bring an action against the insurer for breach of a 
duty to deal fairly and in good faith. The Court turned to the 
Utah Supreme Court's decisions and found that a third party 
beneficiary may not bring an action against an insurer for bad 
faith or wrongful denial of benefits. 
In Pixton, this Court reviewed the Supreme Court's holding 
in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In 
Beck, the insured filed an action for bad faith against the 
insurer based on a refusal to settle the insured's first party 
claim for uninsured motorist benefits. The Beck decision 
determined that there is an implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing between an insurer and its insured. The duty was not 
based in tort, but on the insurance contract between the insured 
and the insurer. The Court in Pixton relied on Beck for the rule 
that even in third party situations, the good faith duty requires 
a contractual relationship: 
The [Beck] court reasoned that such performances 
were what the insured had "bargained and paid for, 
and the insurer has the obligation to perform 
them," or be liable for damages sustained as a 
result of the breach. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that the duty to settle 
claims in good faith is tied to the insurance 
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contract and runs to the insured. See id. at 799-
800. Although faced with a first-party situation, 
the court in Beck also emphasized that, even in 
third-party situations, "the contract itself 
creates a fiduciary relationship because of the 
trust and reliance placed in the insurer by the 
insured." Id. at 799. 
Pixton, 809 P.2d at 748. 
This Court concluded that the Utah Supreme Court's prior 
decisions in the area of insurer liability indicated that there 
was no cause of action for bad faith or wrongful denial of 
benefits by a beneficiary against an insurer. Further, the Court 
noted this was the rule followed by the great majority of 
jurisdictions: 
In sum, we are persuaded that there is no duty of 
good faith and fair dealing imposed upon an 
insurer running to a third party claimant, such as 
Pixton, seeking to recover against the company's 
insured. This conclusion is consistent with the 
commentators and the great majority of courts in 
other jurisdictions that have been confronted with 
the issue. As one well-known commentator on 
insurance has noted, "the duty to exercise due 
care or good faith is owed to the insured and not 
to a third party." 14 G. Couch, Couch on 
Insurance § 51:136 (rev. 2d ed. 1982). 
The majority of courts faced with the 
potential existence of a duty of good faith and 
fair dealing running from an insurance company to 
a third party claimant seeking to recover against 
the company's insured have rejected such a notion. 
Pixton, 809 P.2d at 749-750. 
Ms. Savage quotes the Beck decision in an attempt to argue 
that worker's compensation claimants should be able to bring 
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actions in tort against the insurer. However, Ms. Savage is 
misapplying the Beck holding. Beck held that the duties of an 
insurer to its insured in a first party situation are 
contractual. Beck also allowed that outrageous conduct by an 
insurer towards its insured may give rise to an action in tort in 
a third party situation. However, the duty in tort law which the 
Beck court addressed extended only to the insured, not to the 
third party. As stated, that issue was addressed by the Court of 
Appeals in Pixton. which held that the third party may not bring 
an action for bad faith against an insurer. 
The Supreme Court also refused to allow a third party to 
bring an action against an insurer for bad faith in Ammerman v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 251, 430 P.2d 576 (1967). The 
court in Ammerman indicated that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing arises "because of the policy," and is "regarded as a 
separate cause of action for a wrong done to the insured by 
violating a fiduciary duty owed to him." Id.f at 578 (emphasis 
added.) The Pixton court determined by following Ammerman that 
there can be no bad faith action by a third party against an 
insurer because there is no contractual relationship between 
them. The insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing extends 
only to the insured, with whom it entered the contract. Pixton, 
809 P.2d at 749-780. 
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Ms. Savage is not a party to the insurance contract between 
Educators and the District. She is a third party with no 
contractual relationship to the insurer. Consequently, she 
cannot bring an action against Educators for bad faith under this 
Court's holding in Pixton. 
Ms. Savage claims that worker's compensation insurance 
should be an exception to the rule announced by this Court, 
because it is required by statute. However, other types of 
insurance are also required by statute, yet do not warrant 
special exceptions to this Court's rule requiring a contractual 
relationship for a bad faith action. Automobile owners are 
required to provide certain minimum liability coverage for the 
benefit of those injured by their negligence. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
41-12a-301 to 303, 41-12a-102(9). Yet that fact did not dissuade 
this Court's opinion in Pixton, where the plaintiff brought her 
bad faith action based on the insured's automobile liability 
policy. Pixton, 809 P.2d at 747. Therefore, it is 
inconsequential that worker's compensation insurance is required 
by statute. 
This Court has made it clear that an action for bad faith ils 
founded in contract, and that there must be a contractual 
relationship for a party to bring the action. The fact that the 
insurance contract in this case is for worker's compensation 
insurance does not change the fact that Ms. Savage is a third 
- 12 -
party. She benefits from the insurance policy only to the extent 
that any injured person benefits from the liability insurance of 
a person causing an injury. Consequently, she should not be 
allowed to pursue an action for bad faith. 
Ms. Savage argues in her brief that this Court should allow 
bad faith actions by worker's compensation claimants because 
other jurisdictions have done so. She cites three cases in 
particular, two from Colorado, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 804 (Colo. 1991) and Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985), and one from Nevada, Falline 
v. GNLV Corp.. 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888 (Nev. 1991). However, 
these cases each find that bad faith actions arise in tort. They 
do not confront the requirement of this jurisdiction that there 
be a direct contractual relationship on which to base a bad faith 
insurance action.2 
2While Ms. Savage declares that the Nevada court "did not 
define whether it was in tort or contract," this is not accurate. 
The court in Falline, supra, stated clearly that bad faith 
insurance actions are brought in tort in that jurisdiction: 
Consonant with our prior rulings, we hold that an 
employee who has suffered damage as a result of 
the negligent or bad faith failure or refusal by a 
self-insured employer or its administrator/agent, 
to process and timely pay claims properly asserted 
under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NRS 
616) may pursue a tort action in accordance with 
the limitations set forth in this opinion. 
Falline, 823 P.2d at 893 (emphasis added). 
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Other than the three cases discussed by Ms. Savage, she 
presents a string of cases which she alleges have concluded that 
there is a common law cause of action by an injured worker 
against the employer's worker's compensation insurance carrier. 
However, of these cases, six are based in tort rather than in 
contract, one is based on a statute specifically allowing bad 
faith actions, and one is not a worker's compensation case — it 
involves an insured bringing an action for bad faith against his 
own insurer. Clearly these cases do not alter the reasoning of 
this Court in Pixton, supra. Moreover, while some states may 
allow bad faith actions, many states have denied bad faith 
actions by employees against their employers' worker's 
compensation insurers.6 
3West v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 846 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 
1988); Holman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 
1983); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55 
(Miss. 1985); Nabors v. Travelers Ins. Co., 551 So.2d 308 (Ala. 
1989); Carpentino v. Transport Ins. Co., 609 F.Supp. 556 (D.Conrt. 
1985); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 
273 N.W.2d 220 (1979). Of note is the fact that Wisconsin's 
legislature has acted to reverse by statute the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court's decision in Coleman. See Messner v. Briggs & Stratton 
Corp., 120 Wis.2d 127, 353 N.W. 2d 363 (Ct. App. 1984). 
4Jones v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. App. 
1991). 
5Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 
N.W.2d 368 (1978). 
6See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 469 So.2d 558 (Ala. 1985); Hixon v. 
State Compensation Fund, 115 Ariz. 392, 565 P.2d 898 (App. 1977j; 
Caplan v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 Cal.App.3d 146, 220 
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Ms. Savage also relies on Horton v. Gem State Mut., 794 P.2d 
847 (Utah App. 1990), alleging that the holding in that case 
provides that a bad faith claim can be asserted against an 
insurance carrier. However, the holding of that case is that an 
appellant, claiming there is a lack of evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, must provide an adequate record to allow 
review of the evidence. The case is not pertinent to the matter 
at hand. 
Finally, Ms. Savage claims that Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1004 
provides a statutory right of action by employees against 
worker's compensation insurance carriers. That section states: 
All worker's compensation insurance policies shall 
contain a provision that employees may enforce, in 
their own names, the liability of the insurer. 
Ms. Savage has misconstrued the effect of this statute. It does 
not purport to create any additional liability of the insurer. 
It refers only to the liability of the insurer to provide 
worker's compensation benefits according to the terms of its 
policy contract with the insured employer. This is made clear by 
Cal.Rptr. 549 (2 Dist. 1985); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Whitworth, 
442 So.2d 1078 (Fla.App. 1983); Bright v. Nimmo, 253 Ga. 378, 320 
S.E.2d 365 (1984); Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 111.2d 
441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell. 712 
S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986); Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., Inc. v. 
Leone, 399 So.2d 806 (La.App.), writ denied, 401 So.2d 993 (La. 
1981); Haiciar v. Crawford & Co., 142 Mich.App. 632, 369 N.W.2d 
860 (1985); Young v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.. 588 S.W.2d 
46 (Mo.App. 1979). 
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the companion section to Section 1004. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
1003 sets out the required coverage for worker's compensation 
policies: 
Every insurance policy covering the liability of 
an employer under Title 35, Chapter l, shall cover all 
types of worker's compensation benefits required to be 
provided under that chapter . . . 
(Emphasis added.) This is the liability which may be enforced by 
the employee under Section 1004. The section allows for 
efficient resolution of benefit claims by enabling the employee 
to name the insurer directly on the employee's application for 
hearing. The Industrial Commission's application for hearing 
form specifically requests the identity of the insurer for that 
purpose. Utah Admin. R. R568-1-3E. See Addendum, p. A22. Thus, 
this section does not create any right in an employee to bring a 
civil action for bad faith against an employer's worker's 
compensation insurer. 
It is clear under Utah law that a third party making a claim 
against an insured's insurance policy may not bring an action foir 
bad faith against the insurer. The third party has no 
contractual relationship contract with the insurer, and thus no 
entitlement to bring the action. Ms. Savage is precisely in this 
position, and therefore may not bring her proposed action against 
Educators. Accordingly, the order of the District Court should 
be affirmed. 
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POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED ALL 
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN GRANTING 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
Ms. Savage complains that the District Court did not 
consider all of the allegations of her First Amended Complaint 
when it granted Educators1 Motion to Dismiss. This is not true. 
The District Court expressly stated that "in the context of a 
Motion to Dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are 
accepted as true. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990)." The District Court then summarized the essence of 
Ms. Savage's allegations rather than repeat them all verbatim. 
Nothing in the court's decision implied that the court considered 
only those allegations which were summarized. In fact, the court 
made it clear that all material allegations were considered. 
This is equally clear from the court's detailed conclusions of 
law in which the court carefully considered each cause of action 
raised by Ms. Savage and accepted all of the allegations as true, 
finding as a matter of law that Ms. Savage had failed to state a 
claim. 
Ms. Savage identifies certain allegations which she alleges 
were not considered by the District Court. Many of the 
allegations which Ms. Savage claims were omitted are legal 
conclusions, not factual allegations, and therefore should not be 
considered true. Moreover, each of the "material allegations" 
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which Ms. Savage claims were omitted by the District Court were 
in fact specifically included by the District Court in its 
Findings and Conclusions of Law. (R. 131-136.) Referring to the 
six single-spaced, indented paragraphs included in Ms. Savage's 
brief at pages 15-16, the allegations of the first paragraph were 
cited by the District Court at paragraph 3 of the Findings. (R. 
133). The allegations of Ms. Savage's second paragraph are found 
at paragraph 10 of the Findings. (R. 135). The allegations of 
Ms. Savage's third paragraph are found at paragraph's 5 and 9 of 
the Findings. (R. 133f 135). The allegations of Mr. Savage's 
fourth paragraph are found at paragraphs 3 and 9 of the Findings+ 
(R. 133, 135). The allegations of Ms. Savage's fifth paragraph 
are found at paragraph 11 of the Findings. (R. 135). Finally, 
the allegations of Ms. Savage's sixth paragraph are found at 
paragraph 12 of the Findings. (R. 135-136). 
The allegations allegedly omitted by the District Court 
were, to the contrary, specifically included. The District Court 
specifically stated that all material allegations of the Amended 
Complaint were considered true. Moreover, the District Court 
carefully reviewed each cause of action raised in the Amended 
Complaint in its Conclusions of Law. There is no doubt that the 
District Court considered all material allegations of the Amended 
Complaint as true. Consequently there is no error and no harm to 
Ms. Savage. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Savage is not entitled to bring an action for bad faith 
against Educators because she has no contractual relationship 
with Educators. She is a third party, not the insured. This 
issue has already been ruled upon by this Court. In addition, 
Ms. Savage is simply mistaken when she alleges that the District 
Court failed to consider all of the material allegations of the 
First Amended Complaint. The District Court did in fact 
expressly consider each material allegation. This fact is also 
evidenced by the detailed examination the District Court gave to 
each cause of action raised by Ms. Savage. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this \\o day of February, 1993. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Samuel D. Mcvey 
Stuart F. Weed 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
4 
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- 20 -
ADDENDUM 
INDEX 
PAGE 
Findings and Conclusions of Law. Al 
Order of Dismissal. A13 
Application for Hearing Form. A14 
Utah Code Ann. §§31A-22-1001 to 1009 A15 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-12a-301 to 303 A17 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-103(9) A19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) A21 
Utah Admin. R. R568-1-3E. 
Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Stuart F. Weed (A5557) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
RIF.9 !»S7B3£T COURT 
jh i ' - •'.<•:;od District 
AUG 1 4 1992 
By-fc-^. Deputy Cierk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAT CHRISTINE SAVAGE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUCATORS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 920901786 
Judge Leslie A Lewis 
This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant. 
Plaintiff Christine Savage filed the original complaint in this matter, after which defendant 
Educator's Insurance Company filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, 
Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint, which defendant then included in its motion 
to dismiss. The First Amended Complaint alleged breach of contract as the first cause of 
action, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as the second cause of action, 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress as the third cause of action, tortious or 
bad faith conduct in dealing with plaintiff in the second, third and fourth causes of action, 
breach of fiduciary relationship in the fifth cause of action, and interference with a 
protected property interest in the sixth cause of action. Plaintiff also alleged entitlement 
to punitive damages. 
The Court has received the defendant's motion to dismiss and memorandum in 
support thereof. The Court has also received the plaintiffs memorandum in opposition 
and defendant's reply to plaintiffs memorandum. The matter was submitted for decision 
and was argued before the Court on July 17, 1992. Plaintiff was represented by her 
attorney, John Preston Creer. Defendant was represented by its attorney, Samuel D. 
McVey. The Court has now reviewed the defendant's motion to dismiss and the 
memoranda filed by both parties and has carefully considered the arguments of counsel. 
Being fully advised, the Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS 
In the context of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are 
accepted as true. Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). The 
following findings and allegations are taken from the plaintiffs first amended complaint. 
1. Plaintiff was employed by Jordan School District when she sustained personal 
injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment. (First Amended Complaint, 
111 2, 5, and 6.) 
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2. At the time of plaintiffs injury, defendant was the workers' compensation 
insurance carrier for Jordan School District. Defendant had entered into a contract with 
Jordan School District to provide such insurance. (First Amended Complaint, UK 3, 12.) 
3. Plaintiff underwent surgery and treatment for her injuries, but still suffered from 
extreme lower back pain. Three physicians recommended that she have a dorsal column 
stimulator treatment. (First Amended Complaint, Ml 6 and 7.) 
4. Defendant referred plaintiff to Dr. Gerald Moress for an independent medical 
evaluation (hereinafter "IME"). Dr. Moress provided a written opinion that he knew of no 
further medical treatment for the plaintiffs condition. He was also of the opinion that it 
was not likely that a dorsal column stimulator treatment would relieve the plaintiffs pain. 
(First Amended Complaint, 11 8.) 
5. Based on Dr. Moress' opinion, defendant informed plaintiff that no future 
medical expenses would be covered by workers' compensation insurance, including the 
dorsal column stimulator. Defendant did continue to provide coverage for psychiatric care. 
This occurred on March 6, 1991. (First Amended Complaint, 11 9.) 
6. On or about December 2, 1991, defendant entered into a stipulated findings and 
order in case No. B91000577 before the Industrial Commission of Utah which was 
plaintiffs workers' compensation claim arising out of her industrial injury. In the 
stipulation and order, defendant stipulated that it would pay all of plaintiffs medical 
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expenses arising out of her industrial injury, including the dorsal column stimulator 
treatment. (First Amended Complaint, 1f 10.) 
7. The workers' compensation insurance contract between defendant and Jordan 
School district required defendant to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses 
incurred by plaintiff as the result of accidents or injuries sustained while working for 
Jordan School District. Plaintiff suffered an industrial accident and defendant refused to 
pay for certain medical expenses arising out of the accident. Plaintiff alleges that this 
refusal was a breach of the workers' compensation insurance contract, thus causing damage 
to the plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint, 
!H 14-18.) 
8. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing in 
denying plaintiffs request for certain medical benefits under the workers' compensation 
policy. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant acted wrongfully and unreasonably by failing 
and refusing to make an adequate investigation prior to withholding approval for the 
dorsal column stimulator treatment, by refusing to give reasonable interpretation to the 
provisions of the workers' compensation insurance policy, by acting to protect defendant's 
own financial interest at the expense of the plaintiffs rights, by failing to provide plaintiff 
any reasonable or justifiable basis for denying plaintiff's request for a dorsal column 
stimulator and by forcing plaintiff to engage legal counsel and initiate litigation. Plaintiff 
also alleges that defendant breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
-4-
administer plaintiffs claim for workers' compensation benefits in compliance with Utah 
Code Annotated § 31A-26-303(3)(h). (First Amended Complaint, H 20.) 
9. Plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on 
the plaintiff by using Dr. Moress' IME report as a basis to terminate plaintiffs workers' 
compensation benefits. Plaintiff alleges that such reliance on Dr. Moress' report was not 
sufficient cause for such termination of benefits. (First Amended Complaint, 11 25.) 
10. Also in support of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
plaintiff alleges that defendant was aware that Dr. Moress would provide a conservative 
medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that his opinion would not be 
favorable to plaintiff. (First Amended Complaint, 1 26.) 
11. Plaintiff alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of conduct by using 
Dr. Moress for an IME evaluation, knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company 
rather than being fair, balanced, medically sound and accurate. (First Amended 
Complaint, K 33.) Plaintiff alleges that the defendants should have known that the plaintiff 
and others similarly situated would be damaged through their use of Dr. Moress as an 
IME physician. (First Amended Complaint, 11 34.) 
12. Plaintiff alleges a breach of a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and 
the plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the defendant, by issuing the workers' compensation 
insurance policy to Jordan School District and accepting premiums, agreed and promised 
that if plaintiff incurred covered medical expenses that the duty of the defendant to pay 
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such benefits would arise. Plaintiff alleges that once plaintiff and plaintiffs doctor 
requested a dorsal column stimulator, such request gave rise to a duty to approve the 
requested treatment and pay the benefits associated therewith. After the duty to pay 
benefits arose, plaintiff asserts that such benefits were no longer the property of the 
defendant but were held by the defendant for the sole benefit and use of the plaintiff, 
thereby creating a fiduciary relationship between defendant and plaintiff. Plaintiff claims 
that this duty was breached when the medical treatment was not approved. (First 
Amended Complaint, 1M 39-42.) 
13. Plaintiff alleges that defendant knew that plaintiff was relying on the financial 
assistance from the benefits provided under the workers' compensation insurance policy 
and that plaintiff had a protected property interest in such benefits. Plaintiff alleges that 
defendant intentionally and willfully interfered with this protected property interest in 
denying plaintiff the opportunity to have the dorsal column stimulator treatment. (First 
Amended Complaint, 11 44.) 
14. Plaintiff also alleged throughout the complaint that defendant's conduct was 
willful, malicious, knowing, and reckless, thus entitling plaintiff to punitive damages. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs first cause of action alleges that defendant entered a contract with 
plaintiffs former employer Jordan School District (the "District") to provide workers' 
compensation benefits including reasonable and necessary medical expenses arising out of 
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industrial accidents. Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached that contract by not 
providing certain medical benefits she requested. The determination of whether medical 
treatment is reasonable and necessary is one to be made exclusively by the Industrial 
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 35-1-60. This section provides that the 
workers' compensation remedy is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course 
of their employment. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this 
Title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and . . . the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee . . . and 
no action at law may be maintained against an employer, or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury 
or death of an employee. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides specific procedures to follow in the 
event an employee is dissatisfied with medical benefits provided by the insurance carrier. 
The proper course is to file an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission or 
request other Industrial Commission review. It is not proper to seek review of such 
matters in District Court. Plaintiff has alleged in this cause of action that she was not 
provided with medical benefits which were reasonable and necessary. That determination 
must be addressed by the Industrial Commission, and not by this Court. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice. 
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Plaintiffs second cause of action alleges that defendant breached a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff has also alleged tortious or bad faith 
conduct in defendant's dealing with plaintiff in her second, third and fourth causes of 
action. The Utah courts have made it clear that only an insured can bring an action of 
bad faith or wrongful denial against its insurer. In Pixton v. State Farm. 809 P.2d 746 
(Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the specific issue of whether a 
beneficiary of an insurance policy can bring an action against the insurer for breach of a 
duty to deal fairly and in good faith. The Court found that the Utah Supreme Court's 
prior decisions in the area of insurance carrier liability indicated that there was no cause 
of action for bad faith or wrongful denial of benefits by a beneficiary against an insurer. 
In sum, we a persuaded that there is no duty of good faith and fair 
dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third party claimant, such as 
Pixton, seeking to recover against the company's insured. This conclusion is 
consistent with the commentators and the great majority of courts in other 
jurisdictions that have been confronted with the issue. As one well known 
commentator on insurance law noted, "the duty to exercise due care or good 
faith is owed to the insured and not to a third party." 14G Couch on 
Insurance section 51:136 (Rev. 2d Ed. 1982). 
The majority of courts faced with the potential existence of a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing running from an insurance company to a third 
party claimant seeking to recover against the company's insured have rejected 
such a notion. 
809 P.2d at 749-750. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has also indicated that no bad faith action can be 
brought where there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant 
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insurer. Auerbach Company v. Key Security Policy. Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). A 
contract of insurance is between the insurer and the insured, not the insurer and a third 
party claimant. 
Plaintiff has alleged in her amended complaint that she is a beneficiary to a 
contract of insurance between defendant and Jordan School District. She has alleged that 
the insurance contract was between defendant and the District. The Plaintiff in this action 
is a third party, and is not a party to the contract of insurance between defendant and the 
District. She is therefore not entitled to raise claims of tortious or bad faith conduct, or 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Therefore, the second, third and fourth 
causes of action are dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs third cause of action alleges intentional infliction of severe emotional 
distress because the defendant terminated medical benefits based on an independent 
medical examination report of Dr. Gerald Moress. Plaintiff alleges that defendant sent 
plaintiff to Dr. Moress for the examination, and that defendant knew that Dr. Moress 
would provide a conservative medical opinion and that there was a strong likelihood that 
his opinion would not be favorable to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's reliance 
on Dr. Moress' report in terminating benefits was intentional, unjustified, and caused her 
severe emotional distress. 
It is proper and indicative of good faith conduct for an insurer to rely on an 
expert's opinion in administering a claim or in defending an uncertain claim. The Court of 
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Appeals has held that an insurer is entitled to rely on an expert's opinion. Callioux v. 
Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). Moreover, an insurer is permitted to 
assert its rights to defend against uncertain claims. 
Undoubtedly an insurance company is privileged, in pursuing its own 
economic interests, to assert in a permissible way its legal rights and to 
communicate its position in good faith to its insured even though it is 
substantially certain that in so doing emotional distress will be caused. (Rest. 
2d Torts, section 468 com. G and illus. 14; cf. Rest. Torts, section 773; and 
see generally Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), 'Privilege/ pp. 99-100.) 
Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co.. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. App. 1970). 
Defendant was entitled to assert its legal rights, to defend against uncertain claims and to 
process the plaintiffs claim for additional medical benefits according to the opinion of its 
medical expert. Therefor, plaintiffs third cause of action for intentional infliction of severe 
emotional distress is not viable under these factual allegations, and is legally insufficient. 
The third cause of action is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiff has alleged entitlement to punitive damages. All of plaintiffs claims are in 
contract. Allegations of a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing are contractual in 
nature. Punitive damages are not recoverable under contract claims. Canyon Country 
Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). Therefore, plaintiffs claims for punitive 
damages are dismissed with prejudice. 
The fourth cause of action alleges that defendant engaged in a tortious course of 
conduct by using Dr. Gerald Moress for plaintiffs independent medical examination, 
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allegedly knowing that his opinions favor the insurance company rather than being "fair, 
balanced, medically sound and accurate," However, the defendant was entitled by law to 
select any physician it desired to perform an independent medical examination: 
. . . The defendant may also require the applicant to submit to an 
independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the 
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may 
result in the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
Utah Admin. Rules, R568-1-4(H), (formerly R490-1-4(H)). The Industrial Commission 
rule specifically provides that the defendant in a workers' compensation action may choose 
any physician to perform an examination. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action 
regarding the defendant's selection of a physician to perform an independent medical 
examination is insufficient as a matter of law, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs fifth cause of action alleges that defendant breached a fiduciary 
relationship with the plaintiff by failing to provide certain medical treatment when the 
treatment was requested by plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs fifth cause 
of action for breach of fiduciary relationship fails, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiffs sixth cause of action alleges that defendant interfered with plaintiffs 
protected property interest by denying coverage for certain medical benefits when 
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requested by the plaintiff. For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs sixth cause of action 
for interference with a protected property interest fails, and is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this /yd^ToFAugust, 1992. 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
John Preston Creer 
(M35FWV*lS$4»nSAVAG&FND 
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Samuel D. McVey (A4083) 
Stuart F. Weed (A5557) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAT CHRISTINE SAVAGE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDUCATORS INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 920901786 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Based upon the Findings and Conclusions of Law entered by the Court in this 
matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiffs First Amended Complaint be and 
hereby is DISMISSED in its entirety, WITH PREJUDICE. 
Dated this / ^ day of August, 1992. 
BY THE/COURT 
Approved as to form: 
Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
John Preston Creer 
Form ooi Revised 3/91 Industrial Commission of Utah 
Industrial Accidents Division 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 510250 
S.L.C., UT 84151-0250 
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN WJVCK INK 
'Hit* Inilusin.tl ( ointiiissKiii h, |S 
(lie lollowmi; <!<>< tmiriWs <»n hl< 
Mrriii.il {] 
Kniplciyci Krpoil | ] 
1*11 si I'.iVMtt'lil Kcpoit l J 
('opif's ol llir .IIMIM tliM iinicijls 
will IM* pinvitlrd upon iripirsl 
Applicant (Employee) * 
* 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used * 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
Employer * 
Employers Street Address * 
Employer s Insurance Carrier * 
APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE :*.r>: 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course ol employment vvilh Defendant (employe!) 
on the day of , 19 .at t he lollowing local ion: ((Uvciuunc ft. complete 
address or nearest junction, mile marker, etc.) 
2. The accident occurred as follows: (Describeaccident and resulting injuries (B(xlypart(s) injwed) 
3. The injury caused temporary total disability from to 
Date first oil' \)<iic returned 
4. I have received compensation as follows: (Indicate the last paid amounts you received (weekly or monthly) and 
the last payment date.) 
5. This Claim is filed because: (Please mark an X in the appropriate space(s)) 
A. Unpaid Medical Expenses F. Permanent Total Compensation 
B. Recommended Medical Care G. Travel Expenses 
C. Temporary Total Compensation H. Interest 
D. Temporary Partial Compensation I. Other (specify) 
E. Permanent Partial Compensation . 
6. IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES: (Please fill in or mark appropriate blank) 
My date of birth is . At the time of injury my wage was $ (per hour: day: 
week: month: or other (if other, specify method of payment) and I was working hours per week. 
I was / was not married and had children underage independent on me loi support. 
Date 
Printed Name of Applicant 
Printed Name of Attorney Signature ol Applicant 
Signature of Attorney Street Address ol Applicant 
Street Address & Office # of Attorney City / State / Zip of Applicant 
/ / 
City / State / Zip Telephone Applicants Telephone Social Security # 
PARTX 
WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
31A-22-1001. Obligation to write workers compensation 
insurance. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah shall write all workers' compen-
sation insurance for which application is made to the Workers' Compensation 
Fund of Utah. This requirement does not apply to any other insurer. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1001, enacted by Cross-References. — Workers' compensa-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 183. tion, Chapter 1 of Title 35. 
31A-22-1002. Duration of coverage. 
(1) Any insurer assuming a workers' compensation risk shall carry it until 
the policy is canceled, either: 
(a) by agreement between the Industrial Commission, the insurer, and 
the employer; or 
(b) after 30 days notice by the insurer to the employer, and after notice 
to the Industrial Commission as provided in Section 35-1-47. 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (1) do not affect the requirements of Sec-
tion 31A-22-1001. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1002, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 184; 
1986, ch. 211, § 2; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS natives allowing it to cancel the policy. Com-
t mission of Fin. v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Utah 
Entitlement to workers compensation. 2d 415 367 p 2d 455 (1962) 
—Partner. 
Notice of cancellation. Notice of cancellation. 
—Effect of untimeliness. 
—Effect of untimeliness. 
Entitlement to workers' compensation.
 N o t i c e o f cancellation for nonpayment of pre-
Partner. mium mailed twelve days before the policy was 
An employer was not entitled to workers' to be canceled according to the notice did not 
compensation as a partner when, in fact, he comply with requirement of 30 days' notice and 
was not a partner, even though the State In- therefore was ineffective for purpose of cancel-
surance Fund had endorsed his insurance pol- ing policy at any time. Employers Mut. Liab. 
icy by including him as a partner and the fund Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 192, 
had not taken either of the two statutory alter- 436 P.2d 228 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Workmen's Key Numbers. — Workmen's Compensa-
Compensation § 662. tion *» 1045. 
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 353(1). 
31A-22-1003. Comprehensive coverage. 
Every insurance policy covering the liability of an employer under Chapter 
1, Title 35, shall cover all types of workers compensation benefits required to 
be provided under that chapter. This section does not preclude primary and 
excess coverage being provided under different contracts. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1003, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 91, § 57. ment substituted 'Title 35" for "title 53." 
31A-22-1004 INSURANCE CODE 
31A-22-1004. Direct enforcement by employees. 
All workers compensation insurance policies shall contain a provision that 
employees may enforce, in their own names, the liability of the insurer. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1004, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
31A-22-1005. Payment as bar to recovery. 
Payment of compensation under a workers compensation insurance policy, 
whether in whole or in part, by either the employer or the insurer, bars 
recovery by the employee or his dependents to the extent of the payment. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-1005, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
31A-22-1006. Insurer's constructive knowledge. 
Every workers compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision 
that, as between the employee and the insurer, notice to or knowledge of the 
occurrence of the injury on the part of the employer is considered to be notice 
or knowledge to the insurer. This provision shall also state that the insurer is 
bound by and subject to the orders, findings, decisions, and awards rendered 
against the employer for the payment of compensation on account of compen-
sable accidental injuries or occupational disease disability. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1006, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
31A-22-1007. Employer's insolvency. 
Every workers compensation policy or contract shall contain a provision 
that the insolvency of the employer and his discharge does not relieve the 
insurer from the payment of compensation for injuries or death sustained by 
an employee during the life of that policy or contract. 
History. C. 1953,31A-22-1007, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
31A-22-1008. Employer's breach of safety rules. 
No condition in a workers compensation policy requiring the insured em-
ployer to comply with certain safety rules may excuse the workers compensa-
tion insurer from paying the required benefits to an employee injured as a 
result of the employer's breach of a safety rule that is a condition to the 
workers compensation policy. However, the insurer may bring a claim against 
the insured employer for breach of the policy condition. 
History: C. 1953,31A-22-1008, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
31A-22-1009. Other applicable provisions. 
Workers compensation insurance contracts are subject to any applicable 
requirements of Chapter 1, Title 35. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-1009, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27. 
MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 41-12a-301 
PART III 
OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY 
REQUIREMENT 
41-12a-301. Requirement of owner's or operator's security 
— Exceptions for off-highway vehicles and off-
highway implements of husbandry. 
(1) Every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or oper-
ator's security in effect throughout the registration period of the motor vehi-
cle. 
(2) Every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle which has been physically 
present in this state for more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days 
shall thereafter maintain owner's or operator's security in effect continuously 
throughout the period the motor vehicle remains within Utah. 
(3) The state of Utah and all of its political subdivisions and their respec-
tive departments, institutions, or agencies shall maintain owner's or opera-
tor's security in effect continuously in respect to their motor vehicles. Any 
other state is considered to be a nonresident owner of its motor vehicles and is 
subject to Subsection (2). 
(4) The United States or any political subdivision of it, or any of its agen-
cies, may maintain owner's or operator's security in effect in respect to their 
motor vehicles. 
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required for: 
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 when oper-
ated either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41-22-10.3; or 
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry operated in the manner pre-
scribed by Subsections 41-22-5.5(3) through (5). 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-301, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; L. 1987, ch. 162, § 29. ment added Subsection (5). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Liability of county. mer law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712 
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own ve- P.2d 224 (Utah 1985). 
hides operated by permissive users, under for-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobile C.J.S. — 60 C J .S . Motor Vehicles § 160; 
and Highway Traffic § 156 et seq. 60A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 248. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 144, 147. 
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41-12a-302. Operating motor vehicle without owner's or 
operator's security. 
Any owner of a motor vehicle on which owner's or operator's security is 
required under Section 41-12a-301, who operates his vehicle or permits it to 
be operated on a public highway in this state without owner's security being 
in effect is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Any other person who operates 
the motor vehicle upon a public highway in Utah with the knowledge that the 
owner does not have owner's security in effect is also guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor, unless that person has owner's security on a Utah-registered 
car or its equivalent in effect which covers the operation, by him, of the motor 
vehicle in question. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-302,
 e n a c t e d by Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; L. 1987, ch. 92, § 56. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment corrected a misspelling. 
2a-303, Condition to obtaining registration, license 
plates, or safety inspection. 
The owner of a motor vehicle required to maintain owner's security under 
Section 41-12a-301 may be required to swear or affirm, in writing, or present 
other reasonable evidence that he has owner's security in effect at the time of 
registering, obtaining license plates for, or a safety inspection of the motor 
vehicle. 
History: C. 1953, 4M2a-303, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48. 
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CHAPTER 12a 
MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Part I 
General Provisions 
Section 
41-12a-103. Definitions. 
Part; IV 
Proof of Owner's or Operator's Security 
41-12a-401 Means of providing proof of 
owner's or operator's security. 
41-12a-405. Surety bond as proof of owner's 
or operator's security. 
41-12a-407 Certificate of self-funded cover 
age as proof of owner's or op-
erator's security. out license or registration. 
PART I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
41-12a-103« Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety. 
(2) "Judgment" means any judgment which is final by expiration with-
out appeal of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected, 
or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court of competent juris-
diction of any state or of the United States, upon a cause of action arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle, for dam-
ages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily 
injury to or death of any person, or because of injury to or destruction of 
property including the loss of use thereof, or upon a cause of action on an 
agreement of settlement for such damages. 
(3) "License" or "license certificate" have the ,'•: jme niiviniiigs as under 
Section 41-2-102. 
(4) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle which is de-
signed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers de-
signed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, 
farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well drillers, and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires 
but not operated upon rails. 
(5) "Nonresident" means every person who is not a resident of Utah. 
(6) "Nonresident's operating privilege" means the privilege conferred 
upon a person who is not a resident of Utah by the laws of Utah pertain-
ing to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor 
vehicle owned by him, in Utah 
Section 
41-12a-412. Proof of owner's or operator's 
security required to preserve 
registration. 
Part V 
Post-Accident Security Requirements 
and Satisfaction of Judgments 
41-12a-501. Post-accident security. 
41-12a-505. Effect upon nonresident of use 
of state highways. 
Part VI 
Miscellaneous Enforcement Provisions 
41-12a-603. Operating motor vehicle with-
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(7) "Operator" means every person who is in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle. 
(8) "Owner" means a person who holds legal title to a motor vehicle, is 
a lessee in possession, or if a motor vehicle is the subject of a conditional 
sale or lease with the right of purchase upon performance of the condi-
tions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession 
in the conditional vendee or lessee, or is the subject of a mortgage with 
the mortgagor entitled to possession, then the conditional vendee, lessee, 
or mortgagor is considered to be the owner for the purposes of this chap-
ter", 
(9) "Owner's or operator's security," "owner's security," or "operator's 
security" means any of the following: 
(a) an insurance policy or combination of policies conforming to 
Section 31A-22-302 which is issued by an insurer authorized to do 
business in Utah; 
(b) a surety bond issued by an insurer authorized to do a surety 
business in Utah in which the surety is subject to the minimum 
coverage limits and other requirements of policies conforming to Sec-
tion 31A-22-302, which names the department as a creditor under the 
bond for the use of persons entitled to the proceeds of the bond; 
(c) a deposit with the state treasurer of cash or securities comply-
ing with Section 41-12a-406; 
(d) maintaining a certificate of seif-fiiniietl' >,UN rru^t: under Section 
41-12a-407; 
(e) a policy conforming to Section 31A-22-302 issued by the Risk 
Management Fund created in Section 63-1-47. 
(10) "Registration" means the issuance of the certificates and registra-
tion plates issued under the laws of Utah pertaining to the registration of 
motor vehicles. 
(11) "Self insurance" has the same meaning as provided in Section 
31A-1-301. 
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-103, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1987, ch. 137, § 73; ment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
1991, ch. 203, § I. tions (9)(e) and (11) and made related changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v 
United States, 728 F Supp. 651 (D. Utah 
1989). 
mU.AL'KKAI. REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "entering" or State regulation of motor vehicle rental 
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in- ("you-drive") business, 60 A L.R.4th 784. 
surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including junsdid it »i • 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of poll Lit"ii subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12,l; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction, 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsec-
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; tions (2)(h) through 0') as Subsections (2)(i) 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12, through (k). 
R490. Industrial Coimrission, Industrial Accidents, 
R490-1. Workers1 Compensation Rules - Procedures. 
R490-1-1. Definitions, 
A "Commission" - means the Industria1 Commission of Utah. 
B. "Applicant/Plaintiff" - means an injured employee or his/her 
dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or claiming benefits under the 
Workers1 Compensation and/or Occupational Disease and Disability Laws. 
C. "Defendant" - means an employer, insurance carrier, self-insurer, 
the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, and/or the Uninsured Employers1 Fund. 
D. "Administrative Law Judge" - means a person duly designated by the 
Industrial Commission to hear and determine disputed or other cases under the 
provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter 46b, l!X A 
E. "Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance companies writing 
workers1 compensation and occupational disease and disability insurance, the 
Workers1 Compensation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted self-insuring 
privileges by the Industrial Commission. In all cases involving no insurance 
coverage by the employer, the term "Insurance Carrier" includes the employer. 
F. "Medical Panel" - means a panel appointed by the Commission pursuant 
to the standards set forth in Sections 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is 
responsible to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of a 
compensation claim, and may make any additional findings, perform any tests, 
or make any inquiry as the Commission may require. 
G "Award" - means the finding or decision of the Commission or 
Administrative Law Judge as to the amount of compensation or benefits due any 
injured employee or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee. 
Authority. 
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R490-1-3. Official Forms. 
A. "Employer's First Report o. mjuiy - rorm 122" - 1his form is used 
for reporting accidents, injuries, or occupational diseases as per Section 
35-1-97, U.C.A. This form must be filed within seven days of the occurrence 
of the alleged industrial accident or the employer's first knowledge or 
notification of the same. This form also serves as OSHA Form 101. 
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease 
Form 123" - This form is used by all medical practitioners to report th^ir 
initial treatment of an injured employee, 
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124" - This form is to be 
filed with the insurance carrier or self-insurer after each 15 treatments 
administered by the chiropractic physician. 
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to 
Payment of Benefits - Form 141" - This form is used for reporting the initial 
benefits paid to an injured employee. This form must be filed with or mailed 
to the Industrial Commission on the same date the first payment of 
compensation is mailed to the employee. A copy of this form must accompany 
the first payment. 
E. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to 
Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142" - This form is to be used by insurance 
carriers or self-insured employers to notify an employee of the discontinuance 
of weekly compensation benefits. The form must be mailed to the employee and 
filed with the Commission five days before the date compen -
reason. 
F. "Application for Hearing - Form 001" - Used by an applicant for 
instituting an industrial claim against an insurance carrier, self-insured 
employer, or uninsured employer. This form, obtainable from the Industrial 
Commission, must be filed and signed by the injured employee or his/her agent. 
All blanks must be completed to the best knowledge, belief, or information of 
the injured employee. 
G. "Claim for Protection of Rights - Form 002" - Used by an injured 
employee for the sole purpose of protecting his/her rights even though a 
dispute does not exist. Copies are forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE: 
THIS FORM DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED. 
H. Claim for Dependents 1 Benefits and/or Burial Benefits - Form 025" -
This form is used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee to seek benefits 
as a result of a fatal accident occurring in the course of employment. 
I, This form must be filed before a hearing or an award is made, and 
pleadings will not be accepted in lieu thereof. If pleadings are submitted, 
the'attorney so filing will be supplied the form for filing before any 
proceedings are initiated. 
2 The filing of this for m by t! le surv iving spouse on behalf o? the 
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse's dependent minor children s 
sufficient for all dependents. 
3. Unless otherwise directed by an Administrative 1 aw Judge, the 
* owing information shall be supplied before an Order or an Award is made: 
(a) A certified copy of the marriage license and birth certificates of 
dependent minor children. If such evidence is not readily available, the 
Commission will determine the adequacy of substitute evidence. 
(b) Adoption papers or other decrees of courts of record establishing 
legal responsibility for support of dependent children. 
(c) If either the deceased employee or surviving spouse has been 
involved in divorce proceedings, copies of decrees and orders of the court 
should be supplied. 
I. "Occupational Disease Claim of Employee - Form 026" This form is 
used by an employee claiming benefits under the Occupational Disease 
Disability Act. 
J. "Occupational Disease Claim of Dependent - Form 027" - This form is 
used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee who died as a result of an 
occupational disease. All provisions of Section G above apply equally t*n 'hi* 
form 
.K. "Insurance Company's and Self-Insurer's Final Report of Injur} ami 
Statement of Total Losses - Form 130" - This form is used by insurance 
carriers and self-insurers to report the total losses occurring in a claim for 
any benefits. This form must be filed as soon as final settlement is made but 
in no event more than 30 days from such settlement. This form shall be filed 
for all losses including medical only, compensation, survivor benefits, or any 
combination of all so as to provide complete loss information for each claim. 
L. "Dependents1 Benefit Order - Form 151" - This form is used by the 
Commission in all accidental death cases where no issue of liability for the 
death or establishment of dependency is raised and only one household of 
dependents is involved. The carrier indicates acceptance of liability by 
completing the top half of the form and filing it with the Commission. 
M. "Medical Information Authorization - Form 046" - This form is used 
